C. What Unjust Taking of Another’s Things is, or What Causing Loss to Another in Matters Temporal is

158. About the third article [n.78] the answer is plain from what has been said, because “the straight is judge of itself and of the bent,” On the Soul 1.5.411a4-6; and therefore, from the justice (determined in the other preceding article [nn.102-157]) in the transfers of ownership or of the use of things, the injustice that happens in such things is made apparent.

159. This can be briefly explained by running through them:

For, in the case of giving, there is no justice if the giver does not give purely freely, or gives against the will of someone on whom he depends in giving, as is plain in the case that is alleged there [n.115, and reference]. And he does not give purely freely if he is deceived, or if he gives when dragged, as it were, or compelled by necessity; because ignorance and any sort of compulsion exclude the simply voluntary, Ethics 3.1.1109b35-1110a18. From this follows that one who, as to the reason because of which he gives, is deceived about him to whom he gives, simply does not give; and therefore, if he gives to someone as to a neighbor, who, however, is not a neighbor, he does not simply give; likewise, if he gives to someone as to one in need who is not in need. And so, let them look at every case, namely those who, as being rich, nevertheless receive alms as if they were needy, lest they are receiving everything of this sort unjustly; because voluntariness is not in the giver there, on account of his ignorance of the condition that he is having to regard to in his giving. Likewise, if he is dragged in, as in giving usury, there is no purely free giving.

160. Likewise must it be said about accommodation, although the defect there is not, because of equal vice, equal, because the transfer of use for a time does not require as much liberality as the transfer of ownership.

161. About permutation (barter) there is injustice from the same causes, namely from deception, from what is voluntary, and from prohibition by a superior to whom the one exchanging is subject in his exchanging. And from this can the exchanging that goes on in games of dice and the like be called unjust, according to Justinian Digest XI ch.5 n.4, Gregory IX, Decretals III tit.1 ch.15, Gloss on the Decretals III ibid.“Clerics are prohibited here not only from playing but even from being present at games, so much so that he who is publicly a player of dice is rejected for promotion; and they should not be inspectors of such sort of games.” ²⁸ However this law only binds those who are politically subject to imperial law, who perhaps are none today, because where precisely this law was wont to be in place, town laws take precedence over imperial ones (it is plain in Italy).

162. Injustices in buying and selling were touched on before [nn.129-132], when touching on injustice in their case; and next to these, about leasing and renting out [n.119] the matter is plain. About the giving and paying of loans the chief injustice is usury, the censuring of which is contained in Gregory IX, Decretals V tit. 19 ch.4.

163. The crime of usury is detested in the pages of both Testaments; in the Old it is plain from Ezekiel 18.8-9, “You will not accommodate yourself to usury     etc .,” and in the New from Luke 6.35, “Lend without expecting anything in return.”

164. And if argument is made against this that it is licit for anyone to keep himself from loss in contracts, as was said before [nn.129-132], because the seller can sell for a dearer price, paying attention to his loss in selling, especially if he be induced by the one to whom he sells; therefore     , in the same way, if he be induced by the one to whom he lends, it is licit for him to keep himself from loss, which he cannot do save by receiving something beyond the principal -

165. Similarly, he who gives usury gives it voluntarily, because no one compels him to accept a loan at usury, but by his own will he takes the money and returns more than the principal; and not otherwise can ownership be transferred to another; therefore he transfers ownership; therefore the other, namely the usurer, does not have what is another’s -

166. To the first [n.164] I say that if he does not want to suffer loss, he should keep back the money that is necessary for himself, because no one is compelling him to show mercy to his neighbor; but if he wants to show mercy, he is compelled by the Divine Law not to vitiate the mercy.

To the second [n.165]: although he transfer ownership, yet the receiver is bound to make restoration; just as, in the giving of a loan, ownership is transferred and use, and yet the debtor is bound eventually to restore it to the creditor.

167. Similarly the point is plain about injustice in exchanges, where a delay happens in the receiving; for there is injustice in the selling of time, or in making oneself certain of making a gain, either simply or for the most part.

168. There is injustice likewise when doing business, if one’s act is a hindrance to the republic, or if one receives from the republic immoderately beyond one’s industry, diligence, worry, and perils.

169. Again, besides these partial injustices in these contracts or exchanges, there is a general injustice when someone takes another’s property against the will simply of the owner - and this both as to the proximate owner and the remote owner, namely the legislator, who does not wish, indeed prohibits, seizing the thing without the owner’s will, save in cases of prescription or long established use. But in the following cases there is no transfer of ownership, namely in theft, rapine, and the like, although there is violent seizure of something of which there is an owner; and this injustice is more manifest than any other one where injustice in the transfer or exchange is only because of a defective condition, as in the cases above stated.